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In the Supreme Court 
of the Scite of U tab 
AETNA LOAN COMPANY, a Colo~ 
r ado corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FIDELITY DEPOSIT COMPANY OF 
MARYLAND, a Maryland corporation~ 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9059. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. "j 
Respondent can accept the statement of facts of appella.n t 
for the first four and one· half pages but rejects .as mostly ar gu-
ment and not factual all the material from the middle of page S 
to page 10 of its Btief. 
Where there is no controversy as to the statement of fact 
as taken from the af£ idavit of appellant and as taken from the 
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affidavit of respondent no pro~lem is pres en ted. But the Dis-
tri~ Court denied the motion for summ.ary judgment ufor the 
reason that there exist substantial issues o£ £act between the 
parties.~t (R4 32.) 
It is the position of respondent that when the appellant 
takes an interlocutory a ppea 1 from denial of motion for sum~ 
mary judgment upon the ground that substantial issues of fact 
exist the appellant is before the Supreme Court admitting that 
the facts as contended for by the res pandent and · every fair 
intendment therefrom are true. Abdul kadi, v. Western Pat. R. 
Co.1 7 ·u 2nd 53t 56, 318 P. 2nd 339. This Court cannot at this 
stage ·of the proceedings resolve issues of fact which the Dis~ 
tr ict Court refused to do; and the allegations of the compl~t 
together with the allegations of the answering affidavit of the 
plaintiff and every inference and intendment therefrom will be 
taken as true on this interlocutory appeal. 
There is still a good reason for the interlocutory appeal, 
and it was for this good reason that the respondent did not 
oppose the · appl icatioo-. In other words, the respondent tee· 
o gnizes that there is a question of law p.resen ted by the facts 
of this case~ the resolving of which will be helpful in the 
further handling of the case~ 
Respondent admits that the blanket bond was written 
effective March 7, _195 6, (R~ 7) and that at that time Harold 
Knowles was not in its employ. Respondent admits that a list 
of employes was furnished and that this list was subsequentlY 
amended to include the name of Harold Knowles, although 
the document containing his name is not in evidence. Respond-
ent denies th.a t the furnishing of the name of Harold Knowles 
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or of any of the other persons was gratuitous on the part . of 
respondent, was unsolicited. by. appellant; ·or was a· meaningless 
gesture in the contractual relations of the parties.. · · ... ~ .. · 
. . .. 
Respondent admits that the letter terminating the covet· 
age as to Harold Knowles was received shortly after July. ~.' 
19 56, ( R. 12) and· that sect ion 12 of the bond is· ir) pat~ quoted 
by the appellant at page· 3 of its brief. · 
These admitted facts raise the· folio~ in$' ques tipns. of la ~: 
. . 
1. Has the con duct of the parties creat<;d an .agreement 
for the return of Harold Knowles' coverage? 
. . . . 
, 2. Has the conduct of appellant · been s~ch th~ t it is 
estopped to deny respondent coverage for Harold Kriow les? 
If these are the questions pre sen ted to· this court~ then 
the allegations of the complaint and of the affidavit of David 
A. Robins on must be examined to determine what facts are 
taken as true on this interlocutory appeal and what infe.t:ences 
may be drawn therefrom. 
The complaint alleges that the t (bond was in full force and 
-effectj!l and that Harold Knowles was ··one of the ·employes 
covered by the bond~ I:O and that he made a fniudulent coo-
version. ( R. 1+) It must also be taken as true that Haroid 
Knowles was deleted from coverage on July 2~ · 1956, and 
respondent will ultimately have to show that Knowles was 
covered despite this cancellation. The facts showing return 
to cover age must be found in the affidavit and doc~ents 
£led in the action and now. before the court, and particularly 
in the affidavit of David A~ Robinson filed for respondent .. 
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It will be noted that there is no section o£ the bond (R. 6) 
which deals with return to coverage during the period the 
bond is in effect as to an employe cancelled out under paragraph 
12. This affidavit of Mr. Robinson ··takes issue with certain 
statements of fact contained in .. , the affidavit of Ronald D. 
McGregor. ( R. 1 7.) Consequently there is no admission o! 
prior conduct of Harold Knowles justifying the cancellation 
and pa.rticularl y of know ledge thereof by r_esponden t, there is 
no admission that retaining Knowles in the employ of plaintiff 
was na failure to heed the purported letter of cancetiation'~; 
that the bond wa.s written on any except an annual premium 
basis and ran from year to year, and the afl idavit alleges that 
there were requirements of new lists for the bond in issue a~ 
well as another similar bond between the parties, .and that. the 
list of names of employes was supplied at the specific request 
of appellant's agent. (R. 1 7 and 18 .. ) Agents of the parties 
in May and June, I 9 57 t diScussed '~the need for app~ation~ 
and further information concerning this bond~B and th-e letter, 
Exhibit B" (R. 22) was part of these communications .. Exhibits 
C and D were specific requests fot applica tioos for individual 
coverage on bond No. ~3 61 367. The affidavit alleges that m 
response to all of these 1 etters and requests Exhibit ~ ~Et ~ was 
I orwarded to the Company under this bond which specifically 
lis ted Harold Knowles as a covered employe under date ~£ 
July 18, 1957, and Exhibit "'F" (R .. 26) relating to bond 
53 61 36 7 was also sent in respons-e to these letters and ~equests+ 
(R. 19~) 
Exhjbit UG" (R. 27) is also attached to the affidavit as 
evidence ~~that Harold James Knowles and other persons were 
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accepted on q~elity bonqn Of?. June 7~ 1_~57.- ~-~ is true ,th~..t the 
reply aff ida v i:t of Ronald . :MeG reg.qr takes· ·iss u.~ .. "\\~"j~ this 
statement as to the type ~f.= bonds .. _.r~f~rr_ed to o_.q. ·. ~i~~t: ~ ~.q- ., 
but tespondent.su_bmi~s that the evidenc_e b~fore t~is: co~rt is that 
Exhibit ~ t GJ' refers to other f jd;eli ~y : .bqnds and._. such._ .. is ~the 
posltion of respondent. McGregor~~ r_cply ~ffidavit. refe~s_to this 
bond as protecting aga~n~t ·41 fraud .-and f_r~udl;llent _repre~e~ta~ 
tions.' ~ ( R+ 31.) A. further. evidence that . indiyid~ appl~cation 
was solicited and required ~s . found in .Exhibi~ . ~ .1-~: ·. an·q_. ·~I'' 
attached to . the a£f ida vi t, ~hi bit ~ ~ H ': re~ err iO g to char:tge~ .a.s 
well as applications under ·bond No. 53 61 36710. · .. ·.-·· .·. 
The affidavit of . David . A+· Robinson then · alfeges that 
following the reporting ri"f Harold J arrt~s· · Krio~les to th'~ 
defendant ~tat no time thereafter did defendant notify plaintiff 
that the said Harold James ·Knowles was n?t a covered employe, 
or deny that he wa·s an acceptable employe, as evidenced by 
Exhibit ~~Gn~ or· deny. that he had been reinstated~'~ (R. 20.) 
• • • ~ ;• • •• ".:I 
The ~ida Vi t clOSeS \V l th the S ta ~eiDtn t that t~e CO~! res pong-
ence ,a_nd oral com1n unication betv•leen ·the part.ies · ~ in.dicated 
that defendant kept a file 0 r some .0 ther close . -~heck :On'. e1ri-
ployes who were covered by b~nds ~ ~ ~ and that the_ pi~i~ t1 [f 
relied on the practice est~blished by· the i~~rties for .lts ·.·b~ll~f 
.. that said_ Harold_ James Kno,vles v.-~as. a cov~~ed:empi~'y~ on and 
after July 18~ i957. (R. 20.) . 
ARGUMENT 
I. HAS THE CONDUCT OF THE .PARTIES CREAT-
ED AN AGREEMENT FOR THE RETURN OF HAROLD 
KNOWLES. COVERAGE? 
·. 7 
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The conduct of the parties has created an agreement on 
both of two theories of the facts: F itst, the conversations 
between the agents of appellant and the offkers of respondent 
amounted to a request for confinnatiof;l of coverage under the 
bond, or in effect an ·offer to give co-verage to persons now m 
employment,. which was made de.fi.nite) or accepted, by the 
furnishing of the list of employes which included Harold 
Know 1 es (Exhibit '' E~'' R. 2 5) ; and .second, the conversations 
and correspondence between the parties caused respondent 
to submit a list of employes as an oHer to establish the coverage 
of the existing bond, which offer was accepted by the acqui~ 
escence of appellant and by its failure to object to any of the 
names or to deny coverage as to any of the listed employes. 
The case Lechler vs. Montana Life Insurance Company1 
48 N .. D. 644, 186 N.W. 271, 23 A~L.R. 1193 was an action 
upon a life insurance policy which had lapsed for nonpayment 
of. the second premium. Agents of the company had so]icited 
reinstatement of the policy and obtained the signature of the 
·policyholder to a reinstatement application. The policyholder 
gave the agents ·of the company a note in payment of the 
premium for reinstatement of the policy~ Within five weeks 
the company had returned the promissory note to the soliciting 
agent stating that it could not be received in payment of the 
premium. Six weeks later the policyholder died without ever 
having· been notified by the agent that his note bad not been 
accepted by the company. The court held that the insurer was 
under a duty to return the note and communicate the rejection 
of the application at the petil of being held to the consequences j 
of an assent to the reinstatement.. The court noted that where 
the relations between parties are such that an offeror reason· 
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ably expects a reply~ or where the offeree is under. ·duty to 
notify the offeror that his .proposal is rejected, the failure · to 
communicate·. the . rej ectiori rna y .result ·.in. legal·. assent to the· 
terms of the offer. ·The Notth Dakota Supreme· Court. said~ 
... • ', I ;;: ' • • •• ":" :;-, • • 
~·To the coritention·tliat the lapsed contract could 
not be ·revived···witbout etiterin·g into a new· .. ·contract 
completed by an offer· and an acceptapce~ it need· .0nly 
be stated that there is no p~ciple -of ~w: pecuJ.iarly 
app licab I e to insurance cop.tr act~. which necess~ta te~ .an 
actual communication· of an acceptance in. every in-
stance. There is a well~defined rUle of law) applicable 
to insurance contracts as well as contracts in ·general~ 
that where the relations between parties have. b.~~ ~uc_h 
35 tO justify the offeror in exp~cqng a replyJ OI _'\\(here 
the offeree has come under some duty to commUnicate 
either a rejection or acceptance~ his failure to communi-
cate his rejection or to perform this 41:1 ty rna y result in~ a 
legal assent to the terms of the . off ~r. See Wi ll~s~on 
Contr.", Section 91. Within this principle we think ·th~re 
was a duty to return the note and· communicate the 
rejection in the instant case ·at the· peril of. being ·held 
to the consequences of an asse~t .to the reins_tatem~t .. '' 
1 n his treatise on con tracts Professor Williston discusses 
when silence and inaction may amount to· an ·assent.to· an offer.. 
Vol. I, Section 91, page 279. He points out that there is an 
extension of .this doctrine of silence amounting to an acceptance 
developing in the cases where an off etee solicits the -offer. Id. 
page 288+ Professor Williston notes that because of the relation-
ship of the parties or. other surrounding circumstance~· the 
offeror may be justified a.S. a rea.sonable .. man in interpreting 
the offeree's silence after receiving the -offer as an acceptance. 
He ·also points out that this extension has· been wi_dely applied 
to the insurance field where applications for insurance solicited 
"9 
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-.;\~ere follo~v~d .by· :unreasonable delay in getting. notice of 
rejection. I d. page 2 88 + He c~tes the .fallowing cases as a ~tho rity 
for this· propo$iti9n:. Witten t/S~ Beacon Life Assn., 225. Mo. 
i\.pp. 3~ 7, 33 S~W. (2d) 989; Lechler VJ~ Montana Life ins, Co.~ 
{supra);· Thptnpson vs~ Posta~. Life Ins. Co.J 226 N~Y. 363~ 
. . . . . . . 
123 N .E .. 7)0 .( r.~nstatement); Stanton vs~ Eq!fitable Life As~ 
J(Jrance Soc,~ .137 S.C. 396~ .135 S~E. 367; Kukuska t·'J, flome 
Mutu_~! }Jail-Tornado Ins. Co.} 204 Wis. 166~ 235 N .. W. 403~ 
:A case holdl?g that wh_ere there is a contract of ~surance, 
a memorandum from the insurer proposing changes will be 
~r_e~ted ·as-~ offer which may be accepted or ~eject~d by the 
i~sured is Shakman v.r. United States Credit System~ 92 Wis. 
366, 66 N.w.· 5~8, 3~ L.R~A. 383, 5.3 Am. St Rep._ 920. 
·. /:·· 1~he position of respondent may be restated as follows: . 
A tidelity bond had been entered into in 1956 on employes as 
they existed in .March; a further list of employes was fur:nished 
on which was Harold James Knowles, as a result of \Vhich.list 
the coverage v.,· as cancelled as to Knowles because the investi~ 
ga ti-on ~vas not t 'sa tis factory'' ( R. 12) ~ in 19 57 further identifi . 
. cation of employes w.as discusseQ and requested by the appel· 
1 ant and. a further up-to.date list was sent (Ex hi bit ~ 'E,)' R. 2 5) 
upon whic:h Knowles was again listed; in the meantime Knowles 
. had been accepted on a bond .involving fraud and fraudulent 
representation· coverage (Exhibit '~G, ') R. 27) ~ all of which 
had given respondent the impression that· employes now sub-
lnitted would be covered, unless subsequently rejected, and that 
Knowles ·was now available for coverage. It must be remem · 
b er e.d~ that the 1 etter of cancellation as to Know 1 es did not· state 
that he· w a.s guilty of any fra. ud, dishonesty~ or embezzlement, '• 
10 
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but only that the investigation a5 to him nha.s not been satis-
factory. I~ ( R. 13.) With this background respondent could not 
know whether it was giving coverage to the employes listed on 
Exhibit 4 ~E, ~j in response to an offer £:rom the a.ppellantt or 
whether the appellant was requesting further information to 
give coverage to new employes which coverage would res~lt 
unless there should be a rejection. Since this is a blanket position 
bond~ the most reasonable a.ss urn ption is that coverage was 
being given to all of the ~ployes to be submitted on. a new 
list, with the company reserving the tight to investigate and 
reject any such employes and terminate their coverage. Since 
Knowles was submitted after the bond took effect and his name 
. . . 
was rejected in 19 56, there was no reason to assume that the 
company would do other than check Knowles~ name aga.in 
and accept the coverage if the ear tier unsa tis factory investigation 
was now satisfactory and presumably this would follow from 
the specific clearance of Knowles on the ~~fraud and fraudulent 
misrepresentation bond~ I· (Exhibit ~ ~ G t '' R~ . 2 7 ~) 
II+ HAS THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANT BEEN 
SUCH THAT IT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY RESPONDENT 
COVERAGE FOR HAROLD KNOWLES? 
Respondent contends that two distinct factors~ when con-
sidered together t ~stop the appellant from denying that Mr. 
Harold Knowles was coyered by their fidelity bond. These 
factors are: (1) Appellants issuiog a subsequent. bond and 
covering Ha.told Knowles for fraud and fraudulent misrep-
resentations, the correspondence a.nd solicitations of the agent 
of tbe appellant indicating to respondent that Harold Knowles 
11 
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either v,.Tas ·or could be reinstated a.s a covered employe· under 
this particular _bond; and ( 2) The appellant's remaining sil ~nt 
·after the· submission· to it· of the list of employes containing 
Harold Knowles' name a.nd taking no action to inform respond .. 
ent that _Harold KnoVtrles was not covered by the bond .. 
. ··.·_:::>·~···An estoppel ~ay atiSe from. silence 01 inaction.· 19 Am. 
. . 
Jur., Estoppel_~ Section 55, page ?61~ In the case of Carlson vs. 
Smith, 2l3 Iowa 231, 236 NrW~ 387, 80 ArLrR. 186, the Io·wa 
Supreme Court held that one who stands by with knowledge 
of the understari~ing of another with respect to a proposed 
tra..nsaction between them and ren:iains silent, will not be per-
mitted to maintain that silence constituted a denial of the under-
standing as to what the agreement was. 
Responden_t does not contend that jt was silence alone 
. . . 
which estops appellant from denying coverage. It was remain-
ir;tg silent after ~nvi ting new lists of covered etn ployes v.,T hich .. 
forms the basis for an estoppeL . 
In a recent case the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth 
Grcuit, held an insur a.nce company bound upon a surety bond 
for performance of a construction con tract. T 'fin it y Universal 
Insurance Co. vs .. Gould, 258 F. 2d 883. Mr. Gould w.as attempt-
ing to enforce the penalty on the surety bond for the perform-
ance of a ·contract between himself and a contractor fot the 
construction of G·ould's dwelling. As a defense the fidelity 
company asserted a material al teratibn· of the c~~ truction 
contra~t which worked a breach and discharge of its obligation. 
The court acknowledged this defense and held that any modi~ 
fica tion of the construction contract which material I y increases 
a stlrety~s risk discharges the surety;>s obligation~ The Cowt 
12 
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of Appeals found that the surety was under no duty to declare 
a breach of the bond even though they bad knowledge of the 
material alterations of the construction contract. However~ the 
court l)eld the surety liable und:er the bo~d because of conduct 
\va i\· ing a right to insist upon the breach of the bond. 
The court noted that during the course of construction 
Gould had inform~d the fidelity . coin pan y~ s. manager . of the 
developments in connection with. the building contract. On this 
point the court said: · 
~·But~ a.s a. compensated surety, T r in icy owed its 
patron the duty o~ good faith which ascends t~_e morals 
of the market place-a duty not to deceive or mislead. 
Any course of actiori with knowledge of the · breath 
which can be reasonably constru~d to indicate a diS-
position to continue the suretyship rel-ation woFks a 
waiver of the breach .. fack vJ .. Craighead Rice Milling 
Co.1 8 Cir~~ 167 F. 2d 96; Sormanti vs. Deacutis1 79 RJ. 
361, 89 A~ 2d 191; Spring Garden Building & Loan 
Assns. vs. Rhodes1 126 Pa. Super. 102~ 190 A. 530. 
In this type of case the principles of contract and estoppel 
overlap and it is not easy to isolate them. In addition to the 
facts relied upon as supporting agreement there is the fact that 
respondent ·~~relied on~ t the practice of the parties as g1v1ng 
coverage far Knowles. ( R. 20.) 
The background of this reliance) and the facts reasonably 
to be in1 erred from this reliance are as £ ollows: 
After the bond was first written in March 1956, Knowles 
was added on a supplemental list, appellant scrutinized the 
listj made some investigation, and cancelled as to Knowles, 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without giving any factual basis. Respondent retained J<nowles 
as a satisfactory employe~ He was cleared and covered in June 
195 7, on a fraud bond issued by appellant. (R .. 2 7.) Appellanfs 
agent requested an up-to-date list_. (R·. 19) 20.) Why? Presum-
ably tq ma·ke certain .of coverage and to give ap~llant .a. chance 
t£? investigate thcn1 ~ as they had previous! y done with Knowles. 
Respondent reasonably relied on this ptactke and the clearance 
in Exhibit ~~G'' for believing and .assuming. that Knowles was 
covered until stricken. His year of satisfactory service would 
be added to the previous investigation and the clearance under 
Exhibit .''G/' and he would probably be approved. 
Appellant~ had it martialed its facts, would have known 
.this. It chose to say nothing and might have concluded that 
Knowles ~as now a good risk. By its silence~ when respondent 
re 1 ied on coverage., an estoppel is. operative and the trial court 
should weigh the nature and reasonableness of respondent' .s 
reliance. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The trial court found substantial issues of fact to exist 
in this case and denied the motion for summary judgment. ·i 
On this appeal the allegations of fact in the com plaint and 
in the Robinson affidavit are taken as true, together with 
reasonable intendrrrents and inferences to be drawn therefro~. 
A ppellanf s aff ida vi t stands only as to matters not in conflict 
under this ruleL · 
Respondent by the pleadings and affidavit has informed 
the court tb at it can prove: that the original bond did not include 
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Knowles; that the premium was to be paid annually; that 
Kno"· les · name was submitted on a supplemental list and 
coverage as to him was cancelled by letter of July 2~ 195 6; in 
May and June 19 S 7 ~ appellant's agents requested lists of em-
ployes for this bond and for another .similar bond for related 
companies; in June 1957 Harold Knowles was bonded by 
a ppe 11 ant against ''fraud and fraudulent representation~:>; in 
July 195 7 a current list of employes was submitted to appellant 
in .accordance with requests and Harold Knowles was .an in-
cluded employe; Harold Knowle5 had been in respondenfs 
employ for more than a year and was a satisfactory employe; 
and after sending in Knowles 1 name respondent relied on the 
practice which had developed and the request for submission 
of names as giving coverage. · 
Upon these facts the authorities uphold coverage on a 
theory of contract and also based upon estoppel or upon a 
combination of the two. The trier of facts might alter the facts 
as recited; but if respondent can establish those facts we sub-
mit that a case of liability will be made out. 
WHEREFORE, respondent submits that the ruling of the 
District Court should be affirmed~ 
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Salt Lake .City~ Utah 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
